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Kathy Behrendt
ScraPing Down the PaSt: MeMory anD aMneSia 
in w. g. SeBaLD’S anti-narrative
there has been a recent and refreshing anti-narrativist backlash in the philosophy of personal identity. Led by galen Strawson, the 
anti-narrativist view of the self rejects the picture of a person’s life as 
having or needing a certain shape, unity, direction, and completeness, 
as modelled on stories or literary narratives. the novels of german 
author w. g. Sebald have apparent relevance here for the anti- narrativist. 
they incisively depict lives that resist a narrativist model, and so pro-
vide concrete illustrations of non-narrative possibilities. at the same 
time Sebald’s works cast doubt on a recurring motif in Strawson’s anti-
narrativist outlook, namely the insignificance of memory to the self. 
this throws into question a presumed dichotomy within the narrativist/
anti-narrativist debate: one that places concern for memory on the side 
of the narrativists and permits the anti-narrativist to reject or downplay 
memory’s significance. Sebald’s work cuts through this dichotomy. it 
exemplifies narrative skepticism while conveying a profound sense of 
memory’s importance. 
I
narrativism about the self is a broad-ranging set of views found in 
both philosophy and psychology. no single author or claim sums it up. 
even Daniel Dennett’s oft-cited pronouncement that, “we are all virtuoso 
novelists. . . . we try to make all of our material cohere into a single good 
story”1 can be questioned from within the narrativist camp on several 
counts (including “all,” “virtuoso” and, perhaps, “good”). nevertheless 
some common themes and variations can be noted. 
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the narrativist outlook portrays the self as viewing or actively fitting 
the events of life into some coherent and meaningful form, pattern, or 
story, where the meaning yielded takes us beyond a mere chronology 
of events. the nature of this story, if discussed, is often construed along 
conventional lines as involving a traditional narrative trajectory, including 
some form of closure: “a self is just a kind of life that has a beginning, 
a middle, and an end that are connected in a traditional storylike man-
ner”;2 one’s life is a story that is “understood as a conventional, linear 
narrative.”3 Sometimes the narrative in question is classified generic-
ally, as saga or hagiography, tragedy or comedy, or (for the particularly 
unfortunate amongst us), farce.4 Many narrativists also treat the self as 
literally the product that results from this endeavor, and narrative as a 
condition of self-understanding.5 hence, “a person’s identity is created 
by a self-conception that is narrative in form . . . . constituting an identity 
requires that an individual conceive of his life as having the form and 
the logic of a story” (Schechtman, p. 96), and it is a “basic condition 
of making sense of ourselves, that we grasp our lives in a narrative” 
(taylor, p. 47); narrative is the “essential genre” of self-representation, 
“and not merely . . . one normative ideal among others” (Flanagan, p. 
149). this self-constructing, meaning-generating picture of narrative is 
sometimes accompanied by a view to the effect that the narrative impulse 
is basic and is the means by which we experience the world’s goings-on 
in general: “narrative is not the work of poets, dramatists and novelists 
reflecting upon events which had no narrative order before one was 
imposed by the singer or the writer; narrative form is neither disguise 
nor decoration” (Macintyre, p. 211), and we “seem to have no other 
way of describing ‘lived time’ save in the form of a narrative” (Bruner, 
“Life as narrative,” p. 12). 
this rough characterisation captures what we might call the “strong” 
narrativist outlook. other, more moderate supporters of the view treat 
the narrative impulse as potentially beneficial to self-understanding, 
but they do not promote, and sometimes actively discourage, any lit-
eral reading of the claim that we are the authors of our lives. nor do 
they insist that we cannot but see the world through a narrative lens 
(as opposed to sometimes imposing such structure retrospectively on 
our experience).6 
Memory is undeniably important to any narrativist approach to the 
self. Personal (sometimes called “experiential” or “episodic”) memory 
is a minimal condition for narrativity whether or not the self literally 
depends on the act of self-narration. one has to remember one’s past 
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in order to tell the story of one’s life. this is not to deny that other 
things contribute to the self, but simply to acknowledge memory as a 
primary factor. even narrativist Marya Schechtman, who recognizes the 
power of the subconscious in shaping the self, admits that “the narrative 
self-constitution view does not allow a person’s self-narrative to remain 
entirely subterranean” (p. 114). our self-narratives must to some con-
siderable degree be explicit to ourselves. a large part of this explicit 
self-narrative will inevitably consist in remembered experiences; they 
form the main material of the story. hence personal memory is of clear 
interest and value for narrativist accounts of the self in general. 
Skepticism about narrativist approaches to the self (especially in their 
more common, stronger incarnation) has been expressed by a signifi-
cant minority. But galen Strawson’s provocative “against narrativity” is 
the primary catalyst for the current debate.7 in that paper he contests 
many of the above-mentioned claims. he rejects the narrativist view as 
a psychological description of how we all in fact regard our lives, and 
he condemns it as a normative prescription of how we ought to think 
of ourselves and our lives. viewing our lives as stories and ourselves as 
characters in them does not enhance our self-understanding, our well-
being, or our metaphysical credentials as selves. 
in the context of this attack, Strawson, seemingly in passing, makes 
some intriguing remarks about memory. he suggests that while one’s past 
is clearly important in shaping one’s present self, the value of personal 
memory is often over-rated. we do not need explicitly to recall our past 
experiences in order for them to form who we are. For the “past can be 
alive—arguably more genuinely alive—in the present simply in so far 
as it has helped to shape the way one is in the present” (“an,” p. 432). 
this is a complex statement that, in this particular version of it, pertains 
to Strawson’s episodic view of the self, which is strongly related to but 
nonetheless distinct from the anti-narrativist stance. however, Strawson 
reiterates these claims about memory in the context of articulating his 
position against narrativity (see “an,” pp. 433 and 438), and the appeal 
of the point to the anti-narrative camp is in any case evident; the less 
inclined one is to excavate one’s past through memory, the more resistant 
to self-narrations one will be, lacking as one does the material for their 
construction. while this by no means demands that the anti-narrativist 
divest herself of all attachment to memory, the message is clear: absence 
of any such attachment, or indeed weakness of memory itself, is not a 
fault and not an obstacle to self-constitution or self-understanding. 
Strawson calls on a musical analogy to illustrate his point about the 
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unimportance of memory. the musician’s countless hours of past practice 
are for the most part no longer remembered but nevertheless clearly 
inform his present performance (“an,” p. 432).8 a more Sebaldian 
comparison might be the painting technique of artist Frank auerbach, 
on which Sebald partly modelled the character of Max Ferber in his 
novel The Emigrants.9 For auerbach/Ferber, a finished painting is the 
result of multiple previous versions, each of which is scraped down 
and started over. the final version is ultimately a product of the whole 
process. although no longer available as items that can be explicitly 
referred to, the past versions clearly help determine the final product. 
So it is with our own past, on Strawson’s account: we needn’t remember 
or dwell on it in order for it to form what we are now. he believes that 
this non-conscious “shaping . . . is the deepest continuance of memory” 
(“Blood and Memory”), and “it is only the present shaping consequences 
of the past that matter, not the past as such” (“an,” p. 438). he is fond 
of quoting the earl of Shaftesbury’s proclamation: “the now : the now. 
Mind this: in this is all.”10 hence, he claims to have no “great or special 
interest” in his past (“an,” p. 433). 
II
the genre-defying nature of the works of w. g. Sebald ought to 
endear him to the anti-narrativist movement. alternately classed as fic-
tion, history, travelogue, and sometimes biography, Sebald’s “prose fic-
tion,” as he called it,11 fits comfortably within none of these categories. 
the resistance of these works to generic classification, the absence of 
determinate or conventional plot, and the oblique and open-ended 
course of the accounts, along with Sebald’s steadfast refusal to speak as 
another (instead he reports his “characters’” words, however curious or 
incomplete their accounts may be, in the voice of a narrator who always 
bears a striking resemblance to w. g. Sebald)—all these things would 
seem to ally Sebald to an anti-narrativist outlook. 
however, there is one potentially jarring point of dissimilarity between 
Sebald and the anti-narrativists. whereas vanguard anti-narrativist galen 
Strawson vehemently downplays the significance of memory and the past 
to the self, memory is of overwhelming importance to Sebald. the major 
themes of his novels are loss, trauma, displacement, and the imperative 
but elusive grip of the past. So much of his work consists of the nar-
rator reporting the memories of others. this respective antipathy and 
propensity toward memory is explicit in Strawson and Sebald’s more 
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personal statements on the matter. where Strawson (on the heels of 
proclaiming his own utter lack of narrative sensibility) states, nor “do i 
have any great or special interest in my past” (“an,” p. 433), Sebald has 
said that there “is something terribly alluring to me about the past”; it’s 
“the desire, almost, or the temptation that you might throw yourself into 
it, as it were, over the parapets and down” (Emergence, p. 57). if memory 
marks a dichotomy within the narrativist/anti-narrativist debate, with the 
narrativist accepting and the anti-narrativist doubting its significance, 
and if this dichotomy proves indispensible to the debate, then Sebald’s 
memory-laden works cannot be taken to express or illustrate an anti-
narrativist outlook.
Perhaps this discrepancy in attitudes towards memory can be explained. 
Strawson is only speaking of his past, qua galen Strawson the human 
being, whereas Sebald is clearly concerned with a past beyond personal 
experience, as is consonant with his persistently expressed interest in 
history. when Strawson speaks of having no “great or special interest” 
in his past, he is speaking only of personal memory. he is by no means 
suggesting that the apprehension of the past per se is of little value or 
interest in understanding the present. he is certainly not condoning 
historical ignorance or indifference (i.e. that we cease to remember or 
care that certain things happened in the world). however, while this may 
help to explain the difference between Sebald and Strawson’s attitudes 
toward memory, it also points to shortcomings with the latter. Strawson’s 
indifference towards personal memory may inadvertently nudge him 
(and any anti-narrativist who follows him on this point) towards a more 
troubling historical ignorance. this can be made apparent by appealing 
to Sebald’s use of history. 
Sebald is interested in history as filtered through the lens of those 
whose own pasts colour their historical concerns, to the extent that 
personal and propositional memory often cannot be easily prised apart 
and treated separately. Strawson invites the anti-narrativist to ignore 
these relations, by presenting indifference towards one’s past as a 
reasonable option and one with little in the way of personal, social or 
moral consequences.12 needless to say, this is not uncontroversial. But 
it stands some chance of being defensible if we treat it for what it is: a 
point about personal memory as taken in isolation from propositional 
memory of an historic nature (herein “historical memory”). the real 
difficulty arises when we consider whether personal memory can be 
treated in such isolation. Several of Sebald’s novels call attention to the 
possibility of those for whom lack of interest in the personal past is, ethi-
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cally and perhaps psychologically speaking, not optional because it is tied 
to historical memory often of a traumatic nature (in particular, those 
historical facts that are commonly entrusted to communities of collec-
tive memory). this is a circumstance that runs throughout Sebald’s four 
novels. it is especially prevalent in The Emigrants, as i will discuss, but is 
nowhere more explicit than in his final work of fiction, Austerlitz. 
III
Austerlitz concerns the tormented present and fragmented past of a 
czechoslovakian Jewish man, Jacques austerlitz, who was brought to 
Britain as a young child on the Kindertransport, raised in a welsh cal-
vinist family under a different name, and only later came to know of 
his true identity. austerlitz’s past together with his ongoing attempt to 
recover his lost memories of it, and his quest for information pertain-
ing to his birth family, are recounted to the unnamed narrator of the 
book over a series of meetings between the two of them that span the 
course of many years. 
halfway through the novel we are presented the following striking 
piece of information: our protagonist, despite the fact that he was born 
prior to wwii, lives in London, is oxford-educated, and a professor 
of art history, claims to know “nothing about the conquest of europe 
by the germans and the slave state they set up, and nothing about 
the persecution i had escaped, or at least . . . not much more than a 
salesgirl in a shop . . . knows about the plague or cholera. as far as i 
was concerned the world ended in the late nineteenth century.” we 
learn that such information did of course come his way in some form, 
but that, as austerlitz himself would have it, “i was clearly capable of 
closing my eyes and ears to it, of simply forgetting it like any other 
unpleasantness.”13 
we know by this point in the novel that austerlitz has deeply buried 
memories of his own wartime childhood experiences prior to being 
sent to Britain from Prague. virtually all personal memories from this 
time period are lost to him. this aspect of Sebald’s novel is a relatively 
familiar story of trauma, and subsequent repression and dissociation of 
memory, followed by an extended account of its recovery and the effects 
of that on austerlitz’s already-tenuous sense of identity. austerlitz’s loss 
of early personal memory is understandable and we have many clinical 
and anecdotal models by which to comprehend it. it is apparently excus-
able; he is hardly to be blamed for forgetting the experiences of his early 
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childhood, only pitied. But this new piece of information concerning 
a broader perhaps altogether different sort of amnesia (an historical 
amnesia, as it were—the loss of propositional, non-experiential memory, 
concerning more widely-known historic events) is not so immediately or 
obviously pardonable. this is forgetting of a quite different order and 
magnitude. it is surprising and disturbing, even (as one reviewer of the 
book would have it) shameful.14 For it places austerlitz perilously close 
to those who, for entirely different reasons, are guilty of forgetfulness 
about this time, such people being the target of some of Sebald’s most 
vitriolic assaults elsewhere. thus Austerlitz draws attention to something 
that some philosophers of the self are apt to neglect, concerning the 
relation between personal and propositional (in this case historical-
factual) memory. 
austerlitz prompts us to question the possibility of retaining adequate 
historical memory in the face of substantive personal forgetting. he 
makes salient the plight of those for whom personal memory is bound 
up with factual, historical memory and knowledge, such that the two 
may stand or fall together. as austerlitz explains, when attempting to 
account for his ignorance of the german conquest, “i realized then 
. . . how little practice i had in using my memory, and conversely how 
hard i must always have tried to recollect as little as possible, avoiding 
everything which related in any way to my unknown past” (p. 197). in 
other words, he had to forget the relevant historical information that 
came his way in order to continue to keep painful personal memory at 
bay. But this casts a pall on his otherwise innocuous personal amnesia 
and our tolerance of it. thus personal amnesia gets caught up in the 
whole net of the larger recent past, and the various injunctions against 
forgetting that past. 
what are we to say when the pardonable loss of personal memory 
is sustained by a potentially reprehensible bout of historical amnesia? 
whatever we may think of Strawson’s indifference towards explicit 
recall of past experience, it becomes pernicious if we extend it beyond 
personal memory, to include historical memory and awareness. it is not 
enough that past historical events merely shape the present in ways we 
are not aware of. we often demand their presence be more explicit. the 
model of scraping down past memories and effacing them from explicit 
consciousness is not a palatable option for historical memory. it calls 
to mind historical blindness, in the form of regrettably familiar cases 
of collective amnesia concerning atrocities. and if personal amnesia is 
somehow promoted or sustained through historical-factual forgetting it 
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is likewise tainted by it. thus austerlitz must recover his early personal 
memories in order not to run the risk of being party to one of the more 
notorious outbreaks of collective amnesia of our times.
So while it may be one thing to ask whether austerlitz’s historical 
amnesia is explicable (it is, and suffering and trauma are in large part 
behind it), there remains considerable scope to question whether it is 
ethically tolerable. as it happens, we have reason to take austerlitz at 
his word when he claims to be at fault for his previous ignorance of 
the history of persecution of the Jews (p. 279). this apportioning of 
some of the responsibility for historical memory to the victim is not 
an idiosyncratic notion on Sebald’s part; it is a recurring theme in the 
burgeoning field of the ethics of remembering.15 if we follow the view 
that certain strands of historical memory are morally imperative for 
all concerned, then austerlitz is indeed in the midst of a crisis. what-
ever psychological mechanisms motivate the repression of austerlitz’s 
personal memory, they also hinder his ability to fulfill an imperative of 
recognizing certain historical facts. while this is a situation that we may 
lament, it is not one we can endorse. 
we cannot therefore neglect the relation between the personal and 
the broader historical past. in an effort to distance himself from the rival 
narrativist position, Strawson has not taken into account these particu-
lar potential repercussions of downplaying the importance of personal 
memory, viewing it as he does in isolation from historical memory. 
the case of Austerlitz provokes the question of whether we can entirely 
isolate the personal from the historical in memory. in so doing, it casts 
doubt on the wisdom of downplaying memory’s significance in the anti-
narrativist account. But it does not, i will argue, thereby undermine the 
anti-narrativist account. 
IV
Austerlitz may well appeal to the narrativist, not just because of its 
deep concern with memory, but its embedding of personal histories 
within their larger social and historical contexts. Pioneering narrativist 
alasdair Macintyre, in contrast with Strawson, is highly attuned to the 
connection between personal and historical memory when framing his 
view. he claims that a non-narratively-inclined self “can have no his-
tory.” Upon the narrativist outlook, on the other hand, “the story of my 
life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which 
i derive my identity,” and this social identity coincides with historical 
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identity (p. 221). indeed, Macintyre cites the case of a german born 
after 1945 who feels the war has no moral relevance for his present life, 
as a prime example of culpable, individualistic, anti-narrative detach-
ment (pp. 220–21). For Macintyre, personal narrative and historical 
sensibility go hand in hand. Austerlitz might be taken as an illustration 
of Macintyre’s point. 
i think any attempt to affiliate Sebald with a narrative view of the self 
such as Macintyre’s is misguided for several reasons. if Strawson suffers 
from a disregard of the connection between personal and historical 
memory, Macintyre is guilty of extreme optimism concerning the bene-
fits of that connection. For him, mindfulness of the larger historical 
context of one’s life story helps the narrative quest for the unity of a 
life. this in turn is ultimately a quest for the good—a concept which 
itself depends on a notion of telos and closure (pp. 218–21). once again, 
however, Sebald’s work provides a striking set of counter-examples, in 
which the recovery of personal together with historical memory leads 
not to self-completion but to self-dissolution. austerlitz is an extreme 
case in point. his uncovering of the surfeit of possible meanings, clues 
and connections related to the past results in what has aptly been called 
“an inversed Bildungsroman”—one that leads to “perpetual wandering 
and not to a resolution, the discovery of the self, personal growth, or 
the comfort of home.”16 But there are many other occasions in Sebald 
in which the pursuit of memory, both personal and historical, is tied 
to a depletion of identity. 
recollection and recounting tend to result in bewilderment, despair, 
and sometimes suicide amongst the host of Sebald’s rememberers. 
those who survive the ordeal of recollection gain no gratification or 
enhancement from it. indeed the very act of conveying their past to 
the narrator is often depicted as not so much a sharing of a personal 
history as a relinquishing of it. nowhere is this more apparent than 
among the various characters that populate The Emigrants, another of 
Sebald’s novels of exile, memory, and the resounding costs of wwii. 
The Emigrants concerns four german or east european exiles and the 
resonance that the past continues to have in their later lives. in differ-
ent ways the past catches up with each of the four men, and proves to 
be their undoing. 
the first émigré we encounter, the aging henry Selwyn, kills himself 
soon after recounting his hitherto long-buried past to the narrator, 
and this sets the tone for much of what is to follow. in a later section, 
the narrator’s great-uncle, ambros adelwarth, succumbs to the effects 
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of electro-shock treatment, having divested himself of his memories by 
relaying his past to a relative, in a process described as being “as much 
a torment to him as an attempt at self-liberation” (p. 100). “the more 
Uncle adelwarth told his stories,” we are informed, “the more desolate 
he became,” until he could “no longer shape a single sentence, nor utter 
a single word” (pp. 102–3). and in the final section of the novel, after a 
painful dredging up of his childhood, the émigré german-Jewish painter 
Max Ferber surrenders his mother’s diary to the narrator, proclaiming 
the “work” of remembering to be heartbreaking (p. 193). recollection 
and retelling in The Emigrants is often a protracted affair, and one more 
likely to result in self-dissolution than self-understanding. the paint-
ing analogy takes on a more sinister form here. Memory—the ground 
for self-understanding in narrativist terms—is also the instrument of 
self-destruction, as each attempt at a complete picture is effaced and 
overlaid with another one. 
contrary to Macintyre’s assumption, expansion of personal stories to 
encompass their broader historical context does not alleviate but only 
exacerbates this state of affairs. a grasp of the past self within its larger 
familial and historical landscape contributes to the pain of austerlitz and 
of many of the emigrants. the diary of painter Max Ferber’s mother, 
quoted at length at the end of The Emigrants, provides not merely 
insight into its author but evokes in meticulous detail an entire pre-
wwii german-Jewish community, now irretrievably lost. the broader 
scope of the diary’s import colours and enhances Ferber’s “heart break.” 
Similarly, another character in The Emigrants—the perpetual émigré Paul 
Bereyter—finds himself repeatedly and fatally drawn back to the town 
in Bavaria where he worked as a schoolteacher before losing his job as 
a result of the anti-Jewish laws. he takes increasing interest, in later life, 
in the facts surrounding his family’s persecution. while his own maltreat-
ment was undeniable, it is only after these broader explorations that he 
comes to find his situation intolerable, and he too commits suicide. and 
in Austerlitz, it is not just the protagonist’s recovery of the details of his 
own childhood but his visit to theresienstadt and his first full exposure 
to the facts of the holocaust that precedes his second breakdown. From 
all of this we can gather that, in Sebald’s world, when interest and care 
about the past are present, even imperative, at a personal and at an 
historical level, narrative unity and completeness by no means follow; 
if anything, they are all the more impeded by the weight of history. 
the task of slotting one’s personal past into any larger historical 
context is further impaired by the problematic status of that larger 
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context. Macintyre’s view of history is as narratively oriented as his view 
of individual lives. For him it is merely a matter of how broad the range 
one’s narrative can and should be; it is all one big story. “narrative his-
tory,” he writes, “turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the 
characterization of human actions”; and here Macintyre is referring to 
individual narratives and the “history of the setting or settings to which 
they belong,” including “the social and the historical” (p. 208). But 
Sebald exhibits an extreme skepticism about history, and his ambivalence 
transfers over to any enterprise involving the recovery, by individuals, 
of historical property. 
historical representation is disparagingly portrayed time and again 
in Sebald. it “requires a falsification of perspective,” as the narrator of 
The Rings of Saturn proclaims while surveying the waterloo Panorama, 
because our apparently privileged position of viewing “everything from 
above” and “at once” elides the details, which remain unknown to us.17 
a further point is made by austerlitz’s sympathetic history teacher who, 
when discussing the battle of austerlitz, remarks that while we may 
think we can capture every detail of an event, in fact we invariably end 
up recounting “set pieces”: the harder we try to “reproduce the reality 
. . . the more we find the pictures that make up the stock-in-trade of 
the spectacle of history forcing themselves upon us. . . . our concern 
with history . . . is a concern with pre-formed images already imprinted 
on our brains, images at which we keep staring while the truth lies 
elsewhere, away from it all, somewhere undiscovered” (p. 101). these 
remarks are strikingly reminiscent of the narrativist debate in the field 
of historiography; hayden white, who chronicles this trend, discusses 
and criticizes the impulse to encode historical events into “story-types” 
and understand them in those terms.18 
indeed, Sebald’s own narrator does not escape the trap of superimpos-
ing a misleading or uninformative pattern over individual, unique events. 
the narrator’s attempts to understand the past repeatedly result in its 
falling apart in his hands: “the more images i gathered from the past 
. . . the more unlikely it seemed to me that the past had actually hap-
pened in this or that way, for nothing about it could be called normal: 
most of it was absurd, and if not absurd, then appalling.”19 For Sebald, 
the past as either absurd or appalling is the conundrum of historical 
knowledge. his treatment of the past is as of a struggle between the 
two possibilities of meaninglessness or catastrophe. we often find his 
narrator (in a hospital or a hotel room) attempting to extricate himself 
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from a state of unspecified, melancholic torpor, in order to gather and 
synthesize various fragments of information he has accumulated. But 
the attempt to impose order and meaning on disarray often overshoots 
its mark, resulting in the different events resolving themselves into the 
same pattern: that of destruction or entropy, of an all-encompassing 
nature that does not even respect the distinction between natural and 
manufactured disaster (so the rape of the congo, the firebombing of 
german cities, the english hurricane of 1987, the frightening solar 
eclipse of 1502—to name just a few—are all somehow on a par in Sebald, 
all of them both catastrophic and inevitable). if this is the form-finding 
or pattern-seeking narrative impulse in action, it has arguably over-
stepped its purpose here by reducing everything in its purview to the 
same pattern and thereby, ultimately, depriving us of the possibility of 
any meaningful insight into individual events. it is the inevitably failed 
attempt to impose standard patterns of order on events often too unique 
(and uniquely terrible) to admit of any such reduction. 
For all these reasons, placing one’s past in its historical context does 
not tend to illuminate that past for Sebald’s narrator or his characters. if 
this seems a bleak construal of the effect of historical memory, it is not 
excessively so, given the events in question. yet this simple fact seems 
neglected by both narrativists and anti-narrativists alike: much in the 
past is painful, traumatic, in some cases, indeed, appalling, and does not 
yield without distortion to clear explanation or comprehension. Partly 
for that reason we are compelled (morally, perhaps also psychologically) 
not to forget it or mentally place it to one side. But also, and again partly 
for that reason, we should not expect it to contribute to a greater sense 
of self-unity, understanding, or completeness; that is asking either too 
much, or asking the wrong thing altogether.20 and we can curtail any 
narrativist suggestion that the normative aspect of the thesis still holds 
for Sebald—that Sebald’s characters would be better off if only they 
could have succeeded in piecing the fragments of their past into some 
narratively coherent and complete order. not even within the tenuous 
realm of fictional possibility is this a likely option; meaning, coherence, 
and closure are all things that could only be achieved by falsification, 
elision, or reduction to set-pieces, and no self-respecting narrativist 
would allow for self-enhancement to be wilfully founded on delusion. 
thus Sebald reinforces that while indifference to memory (historical, 
and by association, one’s own) is not an option, nevertheless an interest 
in it need not push one any closer to a narrativist outlook. 
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Sebald’s work exemplifies narrative skepticism while conveying a pro-
found sense of the importance of memory. this cuts through the false 
dichotomy that places concern for memory on the side of the narrativists 
and treats the anti-narrativist as free to reject or downplay memory’s 
significance. the implications for the narrative debate about selves are 
several. one is that the evident importance of memory to narrativism 
is no assurance that those who value the importance of memory will 
embrace the narrative outlook. Sebald offers a stark alternative to this 
outlook—one in which the past and one’s personal connection to it 
make closure, completeness, and self-unity remote, even inappropriate, 
aspirations. But conversely, the anti-narrativist needn’t feel compelled 
to advocate the unimportance of memory in order to sustain her posi-
tion. there is a host of reasons for believing that a deep and compel-
ling interest in the past is not merely the jurisdiction of the narrativist. 
in this respect Sebald’s work is illuminating and perhaps liberating for 
the anti-narrativist. She need not feel constrained to ally herself with 
Strawson’s own down-playing of the importance of memory. 
this sense of liberation, however, may be diminished by the thought 
that it has been achieved through an arguably highly pessimistic treat-
ment of the themes of memory, history, and their relation to self- identity. 
Does Sebald’s treatment of these themes amount to a counsel of 
despair? if we are compelled, perhaps morally obligated, to participate 
in collective memory of certain historical events and also—in so far as 
it is inextricably connected—to sustain a degree of personal memory, 
are the options open to us merely the absurd or the appalling? if this 
is indeed the outlook Sebald wishes to convey, that is his prerogative 
as a writer of “prose fictions.” the philosopher can grant him this 
licence without endorsing it as an accurate view of human history or 
of the prospects for recovery and retention of historical memory. the 
anti-narrativist may wish to part company with Sebald on this point, 
distancing herself from a view of memory as largely an instrument of 
destruction. nonetheless, Sebald’s pessimism—if that is what it is—serves 
as a genuinely useful antidote to Macintyre’s aforementioned optimism 
about personal and social narratives, even if it comes with its own biases 
(and ones which are perhaps more readily accommodated under the 
auspices of literature). 
Sebald reminds us that personal memory cannot be isolated and 
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treated separately from historical memory, and that the moral weight 
of history remains inviolable. But an obligation to remember contains 
no promise of a greater sense of self or of history. hence the necessary 
but heartbreaking work of memory. 
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